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ABSTRACT
Fuzzing is a promising technique for detecting security vulnerabili-
ties. Newly developed fuzzers are typically evaluated in terms of the
number of bugs found on vulnerable programs/binaries. However,
existing corpora usually do not capture the features that prevent
fuzzers from finding bugs, leading to ambiguous conclusions on
the pros and cons of the fuzzers evaluated. A typical example is
that Driller [27] detects more bugs than AFL [2], but its evaluation
cannot establish if the advancement of Driller stems from the con-
colic execution or not, since, for example, its ability in resolving a
dataset’s magic values is unclear.
In this paper, we propose to address the above problem by gen-
erating corpora based on search-hampering features. As a proof-
of-concept, we have designed FEData, a prototype corpus that cur-
rently focuses on four search-hampering features to generate vul-
nerable programs for fuzz testing. Unlike existing corpora that
can only answer “how”, FEData can also further answer “why” by
exposing (or understanding) the reasons for the identified weak-
nesses in a fuzzer. The “why” information serves as the key to the
improvement of fuzzers.
To show the utility of FEData, we evaluate two representative
fuzzers, AFL [2] and AFLFast [8], on FEData. Our results confirm
that AFLFast is indeed faster than AFL in terms of path search,
but at the expense of missing bugs that can be found by AFL in
some programs with “deep” bugs and/or few dataflows. Our FEData
programs have enabled us to identify the root cause, called cycle
explosion, behind (for the first time). Based on this new finding, we
have developed an improved version of AFLFast, called AFLFast+.
Our evaluation demonstrates that AFLFast+ has overcome the cycle
explosion problem, by retaining the efficiency of AFLFast in path
search while also maintaining or even surpassing the bug-finding
capability of AFL for the corpus evaluated.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Fuzzing is an automatic software testing technique that typically
provides random data as inputs to programs and then monitors
them for exceptions such as crashes. Fuzzing can capture bugs1
because the exceptions are usually the indicators of bugs in the
program context. In 1990, B.P. Miller et al. [19] developed the first
fuzzing algorithm (fuzzer for short). Since then, fuzzing has become
one of the major tools for detecting bugs.
The performance of a fuzzer is mainly determined by its capabil-
ity of handling search-hampering features in the contexts of bugs.
For example, if a bug is ‘protected’ by magic values (e.g., 1 in an if
statement ‘if (x==1)’), a fuzzing algorithm has to resolve every
specific value before it triggers the bug. This means that a fuzzer
that resolves more magic values has a higher chance in examining
more vulnerable programs and more bugs. In addition, bugs can
be hidden in a large number of execution paths in a vulnerable
program. Hence, a fuzzer has better performance if it verifies exe-
cution paths for bugs more efficiently. In these two situations, the
number of magic values and execution paths are considered as the
major factors that prevent fuzzing algorithms from exposing the
underlying bugs. As search-hampering features are important to
the fuzzing performance, most fuzzers [8, 11, 14, 17, 21–23, 27, 28]
are tailored to resolve one/several features to increase the coverage
of code inspection.
Though many fuzzers were developed, their appropriate evalua-
tion is still a big challenge due to the lack of supportive corpora.
1Vulnerability is different from bug. Bug brings a program into an unintended state.
When a bug can be exploited by an attacker, the bug becomes a vulnerability [20]. In
the following of this paper, we will use the word “bug” instead of “vulnerability” for
brevity, but what we mean is “vulnerability”.
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To validate a newly developed fuzzer, a corpus needs to contain
the contexts of bugs such as specific search-hampering features
for fuzzing. Those contexts can help validate the advancement of a
fuzzer resolving the specific challenges. However, it is not feasible
for fuzzing so far. In current stage, the usual way to evaluate fuzzers
is to run them on real-world program corpora, and judge their per-
formance by counting the number of unique crashes after a period
of running time (normally 24 hours) [8, 10, 11, 15, 21, 24, 28]. As
disclosed by G. Klees et al. [16], this often leads to ambiguous or
even wrong conclusions on the fuzzers, since it is almost impos-
sible to provide supportive contexts of bugs by inspecting a large
number of programs in corpora. A simple example is that, Driller
[27] detects more bugs than AFL [2] by utilizing concolic execution
to resolve magic values. But the evaluation results may not support
the advancement of Driller when the corpora do not have enough
bugs ‘protected’ by magic values. In fact, even though we reckon
the evaluation results are convincing, we still cannot pinpoint the
reason that leads to fuzzers’ advancements or weaknesses without
contextual details of bugs in corpora. This hampers or even disables
our attempts on improving existing fuzzers.
So far, researchers have already made some efforts to address the
above evaluation challenge. For example, some researchers prefer
to create corpora based on real-world programs, typically from
student code [26], existing bug report databases [18], or by creat-
ing a public bug registry [3, 13]. Despite these proposals provide
corpora contextual details of bugs, they have remained static and
relatively small for fuzzing evaluation. There are also some tries
on creating independently defined public benchmark suites, e.g.
DaCapo [6] and SPEC [5]. Among these attempts, even though they
collect a large volume of real-world vulnerable programs, it is still
painstaking to manually triage the crashes and filter the bugs in
those programs. Before a strong community effort has been applied
to these suites, it is believed that they are not sufficient to support
fuzzing evaluation [16].
An alternative way to create fuzzing corpora is to synthesize
vulnerable programs. Typical examples include early corpora for
buffer overflow detection [31, 32], LAVA and next version LAVA-M
[12], DARPA CGC corpus [1], as well as corpus drawn from NIST
SAMATE project [4]. The synthetic corpora ensure the existence
of bugs by sacrificing their reflection on real-world ones. However,
to the best of our knowledge, none of the above synthetic corpora
have implemented contexts of bugs pertaining to search-hampering
features. Therefore, synthetic corpora also cannot support fuzzing
evaluation according to aforementioned analysis.
In this paper, we propose generating corpora based on search-
hampering features to solve the above challenge. To this end, a
framework is developed and used to synthesize evaluation corpora
in an automatic manner. The vulnerable programs are made up by
function-level structures from GitHub2 code to maintain as much as
possible the style of real-world programs. The framework ensures
the generated programs are able to be compiled, and inserts the
contexts of bugs to the programs when necessary. Holding contexts
of bugs, the generated corpora can not only make the conclusions
of a fuzzer’s advancements solid, but also expose the clues for
improving a fuzzer. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our idea,
2https://github.com
we develop a proof-of-concept corpus, namely FEData, based on
four typical search-hampering features i.e., the dataflow to trigger
bugs, the number of magic values, the number of execution paths,
and the number of checksums.
As a case study, we run AFL and AFLFast [8] on programs from
FEData to validate its utility in fuzzing evaluation. The results of
our experiments confirm the conclusion made by AFLFast that it
finds execution paths faster than AFL. The results also indicate that
AFLFast detects fewer bugs than AFL in some specific programs
from FEData. G. Klees et al. [16] found similar phenomenon that
AFLFast detected fewer bugs when they ran these two fuzzers more
than 24 hours, but they did not explain the reason for it. With
contexts of bugs on those programs, we find that AFLFast is prone
to fall into the cycle explosion state. As AFLFast can no longer
produce new inputs in this state, it will find fewer bugs than AFL.
Accordingly, we improve AFLFast and develop AFLFast+ by setting
a lower bound to the number of inputs produced by AFLFast, which
prevents fuzzing from dropping into the cycle explosion state.
We summarize the contributions as follows:
• We propose generating corpora for fuzzing evaluation based
on search-hampering features. The generation runs in an
automatic manner, and the generated corpora are not only
used for understanding and evaluating fuzzing but also help
improve the fuzzers based on the contexts of bugs.
• We carry out a case study on AFLFast via a proof-of-concept
corpus, called FEData. The corpus is generated based on
four typical search-hampering features. The experimental
results validates the utility of the feature-oriented corpus by
showing its accurate conclusions in fuzzing evaluation.
• We develop AFLFast+ according to AFLFast’s weakness that
we expose in the case study. The experiments show that
AFLFast+ can detect more bugs than AFLFast when other
factors stay the same.
entrance
a[1] > 0x123
a[3] < 0x212
a[2] > 0x126
b[1] > 0x357
b[2] == 0x38
b[3] == 0x37
bug
a[4] > 0x217
end
A
B
C
D
E
G
entrance
a[1] > 0x123
a[3] < 0x212
a[2] == 0x126
b[1] > 0x357
b[2] > 0x38
b[3] > 0x37
bug
a[4] > 0x217
end
A
B
C
D
E
G
(A) A bug without magic values. (B) A bug with two magic values.
Figure 1: Two program examples that have different num-
bers of magic values to protect bugs. It may lead to a wrong
conclusion if fuzzers such as Driller and AFL are evaluated
on program (A). Driller outperforms AFL only on program
(B) since bug is hidden behind two magic value challenges.
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MetricsPolicies
Execution Speed
The Number of Paths
The Number of Crashes
The Number of Bugs
Bug-Searching Speed 
Crash-Searching Speed
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...
Statistical Tests
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...
Corpus
Fuzzers
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Figure 2: The procedure for evaluating fuzzers. Policies limit the way to run fuzz testing. The performance of a fuzzer can be
evaluated based on the metrics, which is mainly determined by the capability of solving challenges.
2 OVERVIEW OF THE IDEA
The idea of generating feature-oriented corpora will help solve the
challenge of fuzzing evaluation. To make the idea clearer, we take
two fuzzers to exemplify the necessity of holding contexts of bugs
for fuzzing evaluation.
We take the evaluation of Driller [27] against AFL [2] as an
example. Driller claims to beat AFL because it can resolve magic
values more efficiently. In fact, Driller is an updated version of AFL
since it takes AFL as the core and adopts concolic execution [25]
to resolve magic values for larger coverage. However, the claim
of Driller may not be supported in fuzzing evaluation sometimes.
As shown in Fig.1(A), because there are no magic values on the
execution path A → B → C → D → E → G, the concolic
execution in Driller makes no difference from AFL to trigger the
bug. Even worse, the concolic execution in Driller takes more time
to resolve the magic value 0x126 in an execution path where there is
no bug. Considering the randomness nature of fuzzing, it is highly
possible for Driller to have aworse performance thanAFL. However,
Driller can outperform AFL on the programs similar to Fig.1(B),
where there are lots of bugs hidden behind magic value challenges.
Therefore, when state-of-art corpora do not provide contexts of
bugs for evaluation, the results may lead to ambiguous or even
wrong conclusions on fuzzers.
It is necessary to implement contexts of bugs such as search-
hampering features in fuzzing evaluation corpora. As shown in
Fig.2, the corpus of vulnerable programs is one of the major compo-
nents in fuzzing evaluation procedure. Fuzzers follow a policy such
as how to generate seeds, and run on the evaluation corpus. The
efficiency of fuzzing is mainly determined by the capability of the
fuzzer solving contextual challenges in programs, such as magic
values, checksums, path search, etc. We can therefore measure the
performance of fuzzers via a list of metrics such as the number of
magic values resolved in the execution. However, to date, the usual
way to judge the performance of a fuzzer is to count the number of
bugs exposed within a fixed period of time. Because the number of
exposed bugs may not be positively correlated to the challenges, it
cannot always indicate the efficiency of a fuzzer. In addition, since
the number of exposed bugs cannot be linked to the metrics without
contexts of bugs in programs, the usual way becomes too superficial
to diagnose the drawbacks of a fuzzer. This explains our technical
motivation as well as the real need to develop fuzzing evaluation
corpora that implement contexts of bugs such as search-hampering
features in vulnerable programs.
We create a framework to automatically generate corpora for
fuzzing evaluation. The framework uses real-world program struc-
tures from GitHub to maintain the synthetic coding style. The con-
texts of bugs is then inserted into the structure, followed by extra
code that ensures the generated programs are able to be compiled.
Different from existing synthetic corpora, the design of our eval-
uation corpora is determined by the type(s) of search-hampering
features that the fuzzer focuses on. In other words, the design is
more ‘feature-oriented’ for fuzzing evaluation.
3 SEARCH-HAMPERING FEATURES
Search-hampering feature is themajor factor that affects the fuzzing
performance and their evaluations according to the above analysis.
In fact, there are many search-hampering features. In this section,
we only select and focus on four typical ones: 1) the dataflow to
trigger bugs, 2) the number of execution paths, 3) the number of
magic values, and 4) the number of checksums. The dataflow to
trigger bugs is a basic and important feature for fuzzing evaluation.
When a fuzzer crashes a program, the dataflow to trigger a bug
can help determine whether the crash is caused by the bug or not.
The other three features are important due to the challenges that
fuzzing attempts to solve. As a program consists of three funda-
mental control structures, which are sequence structure, decision
structure, and loop structure, fuzzers have to find solutions for
the following challenges, 1) checksums, 2) magic values, and 3)
execution path search, in order to reach larger code coverage. To
date, many fuzzers [8–10, 14, 17, 21, 23, 27] have been proposed to
improve the performance of solving these three challenges.
3.1 The Dataflow to Trigger Bugs
A long dataflow will cost fuzzing more time than a short one to
trigger bugs, because the fuzzing has to generate all the inputs in
the dataflow. Therefore, the dataflow to trigger bugs can affect the
efficiency of fuzzing. Moreover, a corpus that provides dataflows
to trigger bugs will help count the bugs accurately. As a crash is
not equivalent to a bug, it may lead to a wrong conclusion about
the efficiency of a fuzzer when the number of unique crashes are
regarded as the number of bugs. For example, suppose that two
execution paths can reach the same bug, i.e., path A→ B → C →
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da == 'k'
db == "Magic"
bug
ba < 'q'
bb > 'g'
end
entrance A
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Figure 3: An example of the bug path and noise paths. The
bug path is A→ B → C → D which can trigger the bug. The
noise paths cannot reach the bug, such as A → B → H →
G → E. ‘T’ means True and ‘F’ means False.
D → G and path A→ E → H → G. Two different crashing inputs
are generated by fuzzers but only one bug exists.
To implement dataflow that triggers bugs, a simple way is to
insert a bug into one program and the execution path to trigger
the bug is unique. Therefore, we do not have to consider the side
effects from multiple dataflows. We call this unique execution path
Bug Path. All the execution paths that cannot reach bugs are called
Noise Paths. Fig.3 shows these two kinds of execution paths. One
of them is the bug path that triggers the bug, i.e.,A→ B → C → D.
The other paths are the noise paths which cannot reach the bug
block, such as A→ B → H → G → E. When conditions in block
B and C are recorded in the corpus, they can be utilized to verify
whether a crash is caused by the inserted bug. If a dataflow satisfies
the recorded conditions, the inserted bug is found.
3.2 The Number of Execution Paths
The number of execution paths affects the efficiency of fuzzing.
Fuzzing spends much time to locate the bug hidden in a large num-
ber of execution paths. Fig.4 shows different numbers of execution
paths, where Fig.4(A) has four execution paths, and 4(B) has 200
execution paths. Fuzzing may spend a few seconds to find the bug
hidden in 4(A), but it will cost fuzzing much more time to locate
the bug hidden in 4(B).
The execution paths in real-world programs are complicated,
making it painstaking to count the number of executing paths. In
order to set the number of execution paths before a program is
synthesized, one way is to restrict the control statements. For ex-
ample, if the following four conditions are satisfied, the number of
execution paths will satisfy p = c + 1, where p denotes the number
of execution paths and c denotes the number of input-related (i.e.,
variables getting their values from inputs) control statement condi-
tions in the bug path. First, the generated programs only have two
control statements, if and while. It is reasonable to have statements
if and while because the combination of these two statements can
substitute any combination of other statements. Then, the condi-
tions in while statement do not contain any input-related variables
and the loops will only repeat for fixed times. This ensures that
a[1] > 'a'
a[2] < 'b'
a[3] > 'c'
bug
end
1
2
3
4
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B
C
E
D
entrance
G
a[199] > 'n'
a[1]  > 'a'
a[2]  < 'b'
a[3]  > 'c'
bug
end
1
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3
200
4
A
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D
E
H
entrance
G
(A) 4 execution paths (B) 200 execution paths
Figure 4: Different numbers of execution paths. It will cost
fuzzing more time to locate the bug in (B) than in (A).
the generated programs will not include infinite loops. Moreover,
the inputs are only utilized by if statement and each input is only
used once. Once this condition is satisfied, the bug path is feasible.
Finally, only the if statement is utilized in the bug path. Therefore,
we can count the number of execution paths accurately.
For example, Listing 1 presents the code implementation for
Fig.4(A). In this example, the dataflow to trigger the bug is (a[1] >
"a", a[2] < "b", a[3] > "c"). In the bug path, the three if statements
have three independent inputs. In Fig.4(A), all the inputs are utilized
in the bug path, and the number of input-related conditions is three
while the number of execution paths is four.
1 int main(int argc , char* argv []){
2 char a[3];
3 int n = 0;
4 fgets(a,3,stdin);
5 while (n < 2) n++;
6 if (strcmp(a[1], 'a') > 0){
7 if (strcmp(a[2], 'b') < 0){
8 if (strcmp(a[3], 'c') > 0){
9 bug();
10 }
11 }
12 }
13 return 0;
14 }
Listing 1: Code for Fig.4(A). Each of the three values that
are stored in the array a is only used once in FEData.
3.3 The Number of Magic Values
A magic value is a constant in the context of programs. In fact, the
nature of fuzzing is to generate inputs and find bugs automatically.
To detect bugs, fuzzers have to pass through checks and find the
bug path. Therefore, it will cost fuzzing more time to find bugs if
the bugs are protected by magic values. We recall the example in
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Fig.1(B) to explain the magic values. In this example, the constants
0x38 and 0x37 are magic values as they are sitting in one side of
the ‘==’ conditions in the if statements. Moreover, because fuzzers
regard every path as a potential bug path, they will attempt to
resolve magic values in the noise paths as well. Therefore, magic
values are important to the efficiency of fuzzing, but it is not always
true for a fuzzer to expose more bugs when it resolves magic values
more efficiently. As an example, Listing 2 shows two magic values,
wherein the magic value ‘MAGIC’ does not protect the bug while
the magic value ‘BYTE’ does.
1 int main(int argc , char ** argv){
2 char inp1[6], inp2 [6];
3 fgets(inp1 , 6, stdin);
4 fgets(inp2 , 6, stdin);
5 if(!strcmp(inp1, "MAGIC")) //magic value
6 {
7 printf("Not a bug.");
8 }
9 if(!strcmp(inp2,"BYTE")) //magic value
10 {
11 bug();
12 }
13 return 0;
14 }
Listing 2: Magic values. Magic value ‘BYTE’ protects the
bug while ‘MAGIC’ does not.
3.4 The Number of Checksums
A checksum is designed to detect errors in a block of digital data.
The effect of checksum is similar to the magic value but resolving
a checksum is more complex because checksum needs complicated
calculations. A checksum function is a function that helps pro-
cess the procedure of calculations. This function can be utilized
in a control statement condition, such as if (func_checksum(a)). In
this scenario, a checksum can be regarded as a more complicated
magic value. For example, Listing 3 shows a simple checksum func-
tion. In this function, two if statements are introduced to check if
specific conditions have been satisfied: 1) ‘lenдth(a)! = 7’ and 2)
‘sum(a)%8 == 3’. We can see from this example that, to resolve a
checksum is more complicated than to resolve a magic value.
1 bool func_checksum(int a[7]){
2 if (length(a)!=7) return False;
3 if (sum(a)%8==3){
4 return True;
5 }
6 else{
7 return False;
8 }
9 }
Listing 3: A simple example of checksum function. Two
steps are taken to ensure that the variable a satisfies the
specific situations.
4 PROOF-OF-CONCEPT: FEDATA
We design a prototype corpus to show the effectiveness of our idea.
We narrow our focus on C programming language, which means all
the programs in FEData are generated in C. We will rewrite almost
all the source code downloaded from the real-world programs and
keep only the structure of them.
It operates in four stages to generate FEData. Fig.5 shows the
design of FEData. We first download many existing C programs
and transform them into data that are suitable for generating our
corpus. Specifically, we extract function call graphs (FCGs) leverag-
ing Doxygen3 and Networkx4. The functions are also simplified to
keep only the structure we need. Then, the context of a bug and the
bug path are inserted into the FCGs. Finally, we insert extra code
to ensure that the generated programs are able to be compiled.
Extract Structure
Information
Doxygen Github C
Programs
Choose a Path, 
Set Dataflow and 
Insert a Bug
Configure the 
Quantity of 
Features
Fulfill the Program
and Compile 
GCC
Crash
Figure 5: The design of FEData. The original programs are
cloned from Github, and then they are transformed into
FCGs. Functions are simplified to insert our code. Then, we
choose a path in FCG to insert the bug. Doxygen is used to
extract information about the FCGs.
4.1 Extract the Structure Information
We download about 18,000 C programs from Github and use Doxy-
gen and Networkx to extract FCGs from them. To automatically
generate a program, we randomly choose one of the 18,000 pro-
grams and add code. Doxygen helps us rebuild the FCGs, but they
cannot be used immediately. We regard each FCG as a directed
graph, in which a function is a vertex. For the simplicity of the
graph, we then use Networkx to break the cycles in the graph.
Networkx is also used to check if all the nodes in the graph are
connected to the main node (i.e., the main function) and to remove
the nodes that have no connection to the main node. This helps
generate an executable program.
The functions are then simplified to insert search-hampering fea-
tures. Only semicolons, braces and keywords of control statements
are used to generate new programs. Specifically, we will add one
3http://www.doxygen.nl/index.html
4https://networkx.github.io
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code line for each semicolon in the simplified functions. Moreover,
the control statement keywords only include if and while. Key-
words else and else if are changed into if. Keyword for is changed
into while. Other keywords, such as break and switch, are removed.
We do not add array or pointer into the noise paths, which avoids
adding bugs accidentally caused by pointers or arrays. Therefore,
the return type and the argument type of a function in the FCG are
the basic data types. If in the original program, the definition of a
function contains pointer types, such data types will be substituted
with basic data types randomly. For example, "char * funa(int *p)"
will be replaced by "int funa(float p)". The types int and float are
chosen randomly from all the basic types.
4.2 Configure the Number of Features
Currently, FEData only selects four features as described in Section
3. After we choose the bug path, different numbers of features can
be inserted into it. Only one dataflow to trigger the inserted bug
exists in a program in FEData. We insert the execution paths that
satisfy the four conditions described in Section 3.2. All magic values
and checksums are inserted into the bug path. FEData includes three
types of programs. The first type of programs has different numbers
of magic values while the number of execution paths is fixed and
the number of checksums is zero. The second includes different
numbers of execution paths while the number of magic values and
the number of checksums are both zero. Similarly, the third has
programs with different numbers of checksums while the number
of execution paths is fixed and the number of magic values is zero.
1 char* vul_var;
2 vul_var =(char*) malloc (20* sizeof(char));
3 strcpy(vul_var , "CWE -761");
4 vul_var = vul_var + 1; //the key line
5 free(vul_var);
Listing 4: An example of CWE-761. The key line is the
reason for the bug.
4.3 Insert a Unique Bug
Based on FCG, FEData can finally insert a bug. FEData first chooses
one path in FCG as the bug path. Then it sets conditions for the
bug path. Finally, at the end of the bug path, it inserts a bug.
4.3.1 Choose the bug path. In the FCG, FEData chooses one path
as the bug path. We first scan all functions and choose the nested
conditions with the maximal number of if statements in each func-
tion. The weight of an edge in FCG is defined as the number of
if statements in the chosen nested conditions in the source node.
The weight of a path is the sum of all the weights of edges in the
path. In Fig.6(A), the function main has nested conditions and the
maximal number of if statements in the nested condition is two,
thus the weights of edges AB and AC are two.
FEData adds a node called bug node into the FCG, and all the
nodes in the original FCG are connected to the bug node. We choose
the bug path based on the new FCG. Recall that in FEData, the
number of execution paths equals the number of input-related
control statements in the bug path plus one (i.e. p = c + 1). Therefore,
if the number of execution paths is set as seven in the bug path, we
should choose a path that has more than six if statements. FEData
finds all the paths in FCG whose weights are equal to or larger
than six and then it picks one of them randomly as the bug path.
In Fig.6(B), three paths A → C → E → F , A → C → D → F
and A → C → D → E → F satisfy the requirement, and FEData
picks the path A→ C → E → F as the bug path randomly. Finally,
we will ensure that only the bug path can reach the bug node, i.e.
all the noise paths cannot reach the bug node. This step ensures
that only one bug path exists in a program. Moreover, it also keeps
simplicity of counting the number of paths. For example, the path
A→ C → D → E → F in Fig.6(B) is set to be infeasible.
4.3.2 Set Conditions for bug path. FEData adds conditions in the
bug path. In Section 4.3.1, the number of execution paths is set as
seven. Therefore, the number of input-related conditions is six. If
the number of magic values and the number of checksums are both
set to one, FEData will randomly pick two of the six if statements,
one for magic value and another for checksum. The remaining four
conditions are set to normal checks.
In Fig.6(C), FEData picks the second condition to insert a magic
value ‘magic’, and chooses the sixth condition to add the checksum
function. The remaining conditions are larger than or smaller than
or always true. Note that, the weight of edge CE is three, but we only
need two statements to insert input-related conditions. Therefore,
one of the three conditions is set to if (1). All the variables from x1
to x6 get their values from inputs.
4.3.3 Insert a Bug. At the end of the bug path, FEData inserts a
bug to the program. Many kinds of bugs are listed on CWE5, and
FEData chooses the kinds of bugs which can be inserted in key
line mode. These bugs can be fixed by removing or changing one
line in the programs. For example, most bugs caused by overflow
are in this category. Meanwhile, FEData can add different bugs to
programs as long as the bugs are in key line mode. FEData can also
be extended to other kinds of bugs, such as logic bugs [12], because
it produces programs from structures of existing programs.
In this paper, FEData inserts a bug, called ‘Free of Pointer not at
Start of Buffer’ (i.e. CWE-761), from CWE. This bug occurs when
a pointer to a memory resource allocated on the heap is released,
but the pointer is not at the start of the buffer. Listing 4 is a simple
example of CWE-761. The key line is the code line that moves the
pointer to the next heap.
5 EVALUATION
Experiments are run on AMD Opteron 6320, and each fuzzer is
run on one core. We typically run two fuzzers, AFL and AFLFast
[8]. We cannot test other fuzzers because they are unavailable
(such as CollAFL [14] and Steelix [17]) or cannot be appropriately
run (such as Driller [27], T-Fuzz [21] and Vuzzer [23]). AFL is a
greybox fuzzing regarded as the baseline by many other fuzzers.
AFL initially sets some seeds and produces many inputs mutated
from these seeds. Then, those inputs will be fed into the testing
program, and new seeds will be selected from the inputs based on
the results of the execution. More inputs will be generated from the
new seeds and those inputs will also be fed into the testing program.
5https://cwe.mitre.org
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(A) The original FCG. The weight
of path A→ C → E is five.
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(B) FCG with a bug vertex. The bug node is a
potential position to insert a bug. The weight
of path A→ C → E → F is seven.
x1 > 'a'
x2 == "magic"
x3 > 'b'
x4 < 'k'
checksum(x5)
x6 > 'n'
main
bug
func_b
func_d
entrance
end
func_a
func_c
if(1)
(C) The execution paths containing bug path
A→ C → E → F .
Figure 6: The procedure to insert a bug. The weight of an edge is the number of if statements in the deepest nested condition
in the source node. Besides, the weight of a path is the sum of all the weights of edges.
This procedure will be processed repeatedly. A cycle is done when
all the seeds are chosen and mutated to produce inputs, and all the
generated inputs have been fed into the testing program. Then, a
new cycle begins. Many fuzzers, including AFLFast, develop their
own algorithms based on AFL [8, 14, 24, 27, 29].
AFL and AFLFast are evaluated on two experiments. The first
one is designed to assess the ability of the two fuzzers to search
specific execution paths. In this experiment, 90 binaries, which
contain different numbers of execution paths and have no specific
checks (i.e., magic value or checksum) in the bug path, are used
to evaluate AFL and AFLFast. We stop fuzzing when it has found
the inserted bug or it has run for 12 hours. Another experiment is
designed to assess the ability of fuzzers to pass magic values. In
this experiment, 15 different binaries are chosen from FEData to
evaluate AFL and AFLFast. Each of the fifteen binaries has twenty
execution paths, one magic value and zero checksums in the bug
path. The length of a magic value is between one and three bytes.
Again, we stop fuzzing when it has found the inserted bug or it
has run for 12 hours. We do not set different numbers of magic
values to evaluate AFL and AFLFast because the two fuzzers are
not designed to resolve magic values.
As for the policies used for evaluation, we set the same seed, use
statistical results, and choose the same programs for both AFL and
AFLFast. Specifically, both of the two fuzzers use Hello World as the
original seed. Besides, we use statistical results to evaluate fuzzers,
i.e., the average time of finding a bug. Moreover, these two fuzzers
are evaluated on the same programs and set the same timeout. We
utilize four metrics, including the execution speed, the number of
bugs found, the number of identified execution paths6, and the
number of cycles that have been executed.
5.1 Experiment I
During this experiment, we are the first to find that AFLFast may
run too many cycles, more than what it needs. This is because
6Note that, AFL can count execution paths but it cannot count them accurately [14].
AFLFast no longer produces inputs and runs through a cycle very
fast. We call this phenomenon cycle explosion. The cycle explo-
sion is a state that a fuzzer can no longer produce new inputs and
will run a large number of cycles. The results are shown in Fig.7
and Table 1.
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Figure 7: AFL and AFLFast are run on 90 binaries. One dot
or triangle indicates an identified bug.
In Fig.7, either a dot or a triangle denotes a bug found by fuzzing.
The result indicates that AFLFast indeed finds bugs faster than AFL.
Fig.7 also shows that AFLFast searches execution paths faster than
AFL in each kind of programs. When the number of execution paths
grows, it costs both AFL and AFLFast more time to trigger bugs.
This trend supports that the number of execution paths affects the
time for fuzzing to find bugs.
However, the results in Table 1 tells a different story. AFLFast
finds fewer bugs thanAFL, especially when the number of execution
paths grows larger. G. Klees et al. also give a similar conclusion
that AFLFast may perform worse than AFL when evaluating longer
than 24 hours. We explore the reason for this conclusion and find
an interesting phenomenon. The reasons that AFLFast cannot find
some bugs are different from AFL. All the four bugs that AFL cannot
find is due to the limited time. However, all the 13 bugs that AFLFast
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Table 1: The Number of Bugs Found in Experiment I
The number of The number of bugs The number of bugs
execution paths found by AFL found by AFLFast
10 10 10
15 10 10
20 10 10
25 9 6
30 10 10
35 9 9
40 9 7
45 9 7
50 10 8
Note: For each program, ten different binaries are included and each binary has only
one bug.
cannot find are because of cycle explosion. Based on Fig.7 and Table
1, the conclusion is that AFLFast finds bugs faster than AFL, but it
has a chance to get trapped in the cycle explosion, especially when
the bugs are protected in a deep path.
5.2 Experiment II
In this experiment, AFL found seven bugs while AFLFast found
none. Fig.8(A) shows the execution speed and Fig.8(B) shows the
number of cycles that have been run. As shown in Fig.8, AFLFast
gets trapped in the cycle explosion quickly. As for AFLFast, the
execution speed drops to 0/s quickly while the number of cycles
rises to millions. Before the 10,000th second, AFLFast has already
been in cycle explosion on all the 15 binaries. After that, AFLFast
can no longer execute binaries and will run through a cycle very
quickly. Therefore, it cannot find bugs since then. However, AFL
executes binaries in a speed between 20/s and 40/s. Besides, the
number of cycles run by AFL is less than 2000.
When cycle explosion occurs, the number of execution paths
found by AFLFast is fewer than 20, which is the number we set for
execution paths. This means AFLFast cannot pass the magic val-
ues and stop finding new execution paths. This experiment shows
that AFLFast performs worse than AFL regarding the number of
bugs found. Therefore, AFLFast does not perform better than AFL
regarding the magic values.
Based on these two experiments, we conclude that AFLFast does
find bugs faster than AFL. However, AFLFast finds fewer bugs than
AFL if bugs are time-consuming for fuzzing to find them.
6 IMPROVEMENT OF AFLFAST (AFLFAST+)
It is impressive that the cycle explosion prevents AFLFast from
triggering bugs in both experiments. Therefore, we dig deeper into
the reason for it and present a solution to improve AFLFast.
6.1 An Interesting Case
First of all, one interesting case from Section 5.1 is analyzed. We
choose a program called "terminology_0_50_", which has 50 execu-
tion paths in the bug path. There are nomagic values and checksums
in the bug path. AFL finds the bug at the 13380th second. AFLFast
(A) The execution speed (per second: /s).
(B) The number of cycles that finished.
Figure 8: Evaluation results of AFLFast and AFL on 15 bina-
ries. Each binary contains one magic value in the bug path.
cannot find the bug even at the 31380th second. Note that we run
AFLFast on its default mode, i.e., the FAST mode.
The results in Fig.9 show the strength and weakness of AFLFast.
In the first 3600 seconds, as shown in Fig.9(A), the speed of finding
execution paths are similar. The performance of AFL and AFLFast
are close at first. This is because AFLFast has to build its Markov
Chain Model at first, in which the transition possibilities are set
during runs.Whenmost transition possibilities of theMarkov Chain
Model are set, AFLFast starts to perform better than AFL, which is
the strength of AFLFast.
The interesting part starts at the 6360th second. Since the 6360th
second, AFLFast stops finding more execution paths, but AFL still
searches for more execution paths. AFL and AFLFast intersect at
the 11280th second, and AFL finally crashes the program at the
13380th second. The nature of AFLFast is to produce inputs that
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prefer less-frequent execution paths, but less-frequent execution
paths may bring fuzzing far from the bug. In this binary, the bug
path is extremely deep, and it will be hit the most often if the
bug position is reached. This explains that AFLFast cannot reach
more execution paths. Meanwhile, at the 6360th second and the
18420th second, the execution speed is very low, which is shown in
Fig.9(B). Especially after the 24180th second, the execution speed
stays at 0/s. According to AFLFast, the number of inputs generated
for examining the binary is inversely proportional to the number of
times that one execution path is exercised. Therefore, when most
execution paths in the program are exercised for a large number of
times, the execution speed will be very low. To make the situation
worse, because each seed is assigned to a very low number of inputs,
fuzzing will go through a cycle very quickly. The consequence is,
the number of cycles done by fuzzing grows to a large number.
This is the cycle explosion. In Fig.9(C), AFLFast runs more than 10
million cycles after the 24180th second, which comes along with
0 input being produced. It explains the reason why the execution
speed is 0/s after the 24180th second in Fig.9(B). On the other hand,
AFL almost stays executing binaries at the speed about 50/s.
6.2 AFLFast+
AFL assigns almost constant energy (i.e., the number of inputs gen-
erated from seeds) to each seed. Therefore, AFL does not cause cycle
explosion and even can find bugs in one cycle. AFLFast improves
AFL by assigning different number of inputs to a seed. Different mu-
tation strategies, including FAST mode, LINEAR mode, and QUAD
mode, are utilized by AFLFast.
The FAST mode assigns energy to state i as
pf (i) = min
(
α(i)
β
· 2
s(i)
f (i) ,M
)
(1)
Where α(i) is the number of inputs generated by AFL, s(i) is the
number of times that seed di is chosen from the seed queue, f (i)
is the number of generated inputs that have exercised state i . The
constantM provides an upper bound on the number of inputs that
are generated per fuzzing iteration.
The LINEAR mode increases the energy of state i linearly with
respect to s(i), which is
pl (i) = min
(
α(i)
β
· s(i)
f (i) ,M
)
(2)
The QUAD mode is based on the LINEAR mode, and the energy
of fuzzing is computed as
pd (i) = min
(
α(i)
β
· s(i)
2
f (i) ,M
)
(3)
All these three power schedules assign energy to state i inversely
proportional to f (i), which is the reason for cycle explosion. When
f (i) grows to a large value, the energy is very low. To improve
AFLFast, one way is to set a lower bound to its energy strategies.
L is a lower bound set for AFLFast. Therefore, the FAST mode is
improved as
qf (i) = max
(
pf (i),L
)
(4)
For the LINEAR mode, we have
ql (i) = max
(
pl (i),L
)
(5)
Table 2: Bugs Found by AFLFast+ and AFLFast
The number of The number of bugs The number of bugs
execution paths found by AFLFast+ found by AFLFast
10 10 10
15 10 10
20 10 10
25 10 6
30 10 10
35 10 9
40 9 7
45 9 7
50 10 8
Note: For each program, ten different binaries are included and each binary has only
one bug.
And for the QUAD mode, we also have
qd (i) = max
(
pd (i),L
)
(6)
6.2.1 Evaluation about Cycle Explosion. With the AFLFast+, the
results of testing the interesting case are shown in Fig.10. The bug,
which is not found by AFLFast, is exposed by AFLFast+. Mean-
while, AFLFast+ still searches execution paths faster than AFL. The
number of cycles run by AFLFast+ is in a reasonable range.
To research on the issue about cycle explosion of AFLFast and
AFLFast+, a different program, "BMFS_31_1_10", is chosen. The new
program only has ten execution paths but contains a magic value
in the bug path. We run AFLFast and AFLFast+ on this program
for ten minutes. During the experiment, only one execution path
is found by both fuzzers because the magic value prevents them
from searching for more execution paths. This is the worst case
for AFLFast, in which all the genetated inputs exercise the same
execution path. Therefore, there are few or no new inputs will be
generated by AFLFast. However, as for AFLFast+, it has a lower
bound to avoid producing no inputs. The number of cycles and
the execution speed are shown in Fig.11. AFLFast quickly falls into
the cycle explosion while AFLFast+ runs a cycle at a reasonable
speed. In Fig.11, the execution speed of AFLFast decreases fast and
stays at 0/s after the 77th second. However, the execution speed of
AFLFast+ is around 60/s throughout ten minutes.
6.2.2 Evaluation On the 105 Binaries. We evaluate our AFLFast+
on the 90 binaries in Experiment I. Fig.12 shows that the efficiency
of AFLFast and AFLFast+ is almost the same. However, AFLFast+
finds 88 bugs while AFLFast finds only 77 bugs, which is shown in
Table 2. Meanwhile, the reason of the two bugs not being found by
AFLFast+ is due to the limited time, and the cycle explosion does
not appear. We also run AFLFast+ on the 15 binaries in Experiment
II. Five bugs are detected by AFLFast+. Recall that, in Experiment
II, AFLFast finds no bugs. Therefore, AFLFast+ keeps the efficiency
but can detect more bugs than AFLFast.
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Figure 9: An interesting case. In the first 3600 seconds, AFL and AFLFast find execution paths at almost the same speed. From
the 3600th second to the 6360th second, AFLFast finds execution paths faster than AFL. The interesting part is that AFLFast
cannot find more execution paths since the 6360th second while AFL finds more execution paths until it crashes the program.
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Figure 10: Run AFLFast+ on "terminology_0_50_".
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Figure 11: Cycle Explosion. AFLFast and AFLFast+ are run on "BMFS_31_1_10".
7 RELATEDWORK
7.1 Corpora
There is not much work about synthesizing corpora for fuzzing.
The closest research is LAVA. The main idea of LAVA is to insert a
bug into a real-world program, and the synthetic program keeps
the contexts of real-world programs. LAVA uses taint analysis to
search DUAs (Dead, Uncomplicated and Available data) in pro-
grams, which is the key to maintain the realness. Based on the
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Figure 12: The results of AFLFast and AFLFast+ which are
tested on 90 binaries. One dot or triangle is a bug found.
DUAs, LAVA inserts some bugs and adds magic values to protect
the bugs. As it is based on taint analysis, the number of potential
bugs to be inserted depends on the knowledge about the target
real-world programs, which limits LAVA to insert more bugs. Mean-
while, LAVA offers dataflow to trigger bugs, but the details about
the bug path are ambiguous. LAVA synthesizes a program based on
the idea that the inserted bugs can be found in real-world programs.
Although LAVA-M argues the realness of its generated programs, re-
cent experiment7 shows that techniques following a simple pattern
effectively find all of the LAVA-M bugs. Another synthetic corpus
is DARPA CGC, which includes hundreds of programs. DARPA’s
competitors test their algorithms on CGC and attempt to discover
as many bugs as possible in 24 hours. CGC has the same weakness
as LAVA that features preventing fuzzers from finding bugs are not
quantified. Moreover, the NIST Software Assurance Metrics And
Tool Evaluation (SAMATE) project assembles a large public corpus,
including 86,864 synthetic C and Java programs that exhibit 118
different CWEs. However, programs in this corpus contains few
search-hampering features. Therefore, it is impossible to evaluate
fuzzing individually on these features.
Most fuzzers [7, 9, 10, 14, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28] evaluate their per-
formance on real-world programs that is manually collected. Such
programs usually do not provide with information about bugs, and
some even do not know whether there exist bugs. However, almost
none of them use the same programs if their versions are consid-
ered. This makes it difficult to compare the performance of fuzzers.
The collection of real-world programs is tedious and painstaking.
The Google Fuzzer Test Suite is a collection of real-world programs.
To the day the paper is written, 25 programs are collected. This
corpus has information about bugs but does not include the details
about features.
7.2 Fuzzing Algorithms
Many fuzzers are designed to present solutions for the three chal-
lenges, including checksum, magic value, and execution path search.
Coverage-guided fuzzers try to reach as much code coverage as
possible. Some papers try to reach larger coverage by requiring
inputs to comply with a specific data format (such as size, type, and
checksum). MoWF [22] and Skyfire [28] extract specific data format
7http://moyix.blogspot.com/2018/03/of-bugs-and-baselines.html
from existing corpora. Difuze [11] uses static analysis to compose
correctly-structured inputs. TaintScope [30] leverages a checksum
detection algorithm to remove checksums. Fuzzers try their efforts
on satisfying the data format that programs require.
When a fuzzer confronts magic values, it has to satisfy all the
bytes otherwise it fails the check and cannot run the code protected
by them. Therefore, if a bug is protected by magic values, a fuzzer
has to figure out the specific values, and then the bug can be trig-
gered. Many papers propose different algorithms to resolve magic
values. Steelix [17] instruments the binary to provide coverage and
comparison progress information and infer the location informa-
tion of magic values. Such information is then used to guide the
mutation. T-Fuzz [21] flips the conditions for conditional jumps in
order to pass the specific checks. That is, when fuzzing gets stuck,
T-Fuzz negates the condition to help pass the check. Driller [27]
uses symbolic execution to resolve the magic value. Angora [10]
mutates only the bytes that solve the path constraints instead of
the entire inputs.
The number of execution paths in the program affects the effi-
ciency of fuzzing. If a program only has one execution path, a fuzzer
can go through the program and find the bug quickly (no checks
about magic values and data format in the program). AFLFast [8]
takes Markov chain as the model of transitions between states and
leverages this model to guide fuzzing to generate inputs that prefer
less-frequent execution paths. CollAFL [14] improves AFL via miti-
gating path collisions. It changes the computation of hash for edges,
which improves the ability to differentiate paths. Vuzzer [23] uses
static analysis to model the control flow graph as Markov model,
based on which it tries to guide fuzzing to generate inputs to reach
larger code coverage.
8 DISCUSSION: THREAT TO VALIDITY
Although FEData works well on AFL and AFLFast, it can be further
improved. Issues such as the ways to evaluate FEData and improve
FEData can be further discussed.
The Variety of Fuzzers. We only run AFL and AFLFast on
FEData because other fuzzers are unavailable or cannot be appro-
priately run. In order to further assess FEData, different fuzzers
should be run on FEData. Different fuzzers focus on solving differ-
ent challenges. AFLFast matches the feature of execution path in
FEData because AFLFast aims to find execution paths faster than
other fuzzers. Therefore, in our experiments, we run AFLFast on 90
binaries which have a different number of execution paths. Besides,
the feature of magic value is also validated by AFLFast, to some
extent, because it indeed performs worse than AFL on some pro-
grams of FEData. In order to assess the feature of magic value in
FEData, a better way is to use fuzzers trying to help resolve magic
values, such as Driller and T-Fuzz. Similarly, it is better to assess the
feature of checksum in FEData by fuzzers focusing on checksums.
We will continue our investigation to run more fuzzers on FEData.
The Realness of FEData. To customize search-hampering fea-
tures in the contexts of bugs, FEData sacrifices some realness of the
generated programs. To make FEData more similar to real-world
programs, one way is to add functionality by functional program-
ming. For example, it does not affect a program if the functions in
the noise paths change. Therefore, we can add functionality into
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such functions. Another way to improve the realness of FEData is
to research the contexts behind bugs. And such contexts can be
added to FEData when a bug is inserted.
Issues About the Inserted Bugs. Bugs in FEData are inserted
in a specific pattern. Therefore, similarly to LAVA, some simple
algorithms may find all the inserted bugs. In fact, more efforts
need to be made on this issue, such as how to insert bugs more
complexly. The directed fuzzers first search some targets, among
which they hope bugs are included. To make it complicated for
searching targets, FEData can add bug-free code that is similar
to the inserted bug, such as adding code without the key line of
bugs. Another problem is about the unique bug, which is only
one in one program. This may cause problems because the code
coverage detected by fuzzers is not precise. Bugs may be invisible
if different coverage is identified as the same one. Therefore, the
bug in a program may not be triggered at all. To fix this, fuzzers
have to develop new algorithms for more precise coverage. As to
the usage of FEData, the result will be more convincing if fuzzers
are evaluated on a number of binaries.
9 CONCLUSION
In order to evaluate fuzzing more specifically and effectively, we
propose generating corpora based on search-hampering features.
Further, we design a prototype corpus, FEData, to show the effec-
tiveness of our idea. While other corpora focus on bugs, FEData
focuses on the search-hampering features. FEData tests the abil-
ity of fuzzers to find solutions for challenges, i.e., the dataflow to
trigger bugs, execution path search, magic values, and checksums.
Fuzzing is designed to detect bugs, so the dataflow to trigger bugs
is a basic feature and can help count the number of bugs accurately.
We extract the other three features from the basic structures of pro-
grams. FEData includes programs that contain a different number
of these three features. Details about the features are described in
this paper.
AFL and AFLFast are evaluated on FEData. The advancement
of AFLFast, which is AFLFast finds execution paths faster than
AFL, is supported by FEData. However, the drawback of AFLFast is
magnified by some programs in FEData. We find that AFLFast is
prone to be trapped in cycle explosion (for the first time) if bugs
are embedded deeply or fuzzers hit some specific execution paths
in a large quantity. Therefore, AFLFast is improved to AFLFast+ via
setting a lower bound to its energy strategies. The results show that
AFLFast+ can find more bugs than AFLFast while the efficiency
stays the same.
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